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Some Summary Statements on the Environment 
 Perhaps the biggest national security concern is the U.S. 
economy – former Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff: “America’s 
#1 national security threat is the deficit.” 
 Regarding the Security Environment – Former Director of 
National Intelligence: “More challenges today than we’ve had in 
the last 50 years.” 
 In terms of the combined economic and security environment – a 
senior military officer in the intelligence field: “the controlling       
concern we have today is uncertainty.” 
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The needs, therefore, are:  
 Do more with less – and recognize that “even how much 
less” is uncertain 
 Respond much faster – to the rapidly-changing, and 
uncertain, threat environment 
Maintain technological leadership – in all areas (e.g. in 
cybersecurity, and in intelligence from Big Data Analytics); 
while recognizing that technology, industry, and labor today 
are globalized (and, in many areas, the technological 
leadership exists  in commercial or foreign firms -- not in 
DoD) 
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Background 
 Reforms over the past five decades used differing strategies to change 












Cutting Waste, Fraud, and Abuse Altering Phases, Milestones, and Requirements 
Increasing Efficiency 
Restructuring the DoD Management 
Structure and Chain of Command 
and Promoting Commercial Products 
Improving Quality of the DoD 
Acquisition Workforce 
Training, Education, and Experience 
Requirements for Program Managers 
Meaningful reform and successful implementation are 
more important now than ever before to provide the 
required systems affordably 
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Early Acquisition Reforms 
 1961-1968: McNamara Innovations 
 Centralized planning and management, by developing the Planning, 
Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS)  
 Introduced and promoted Total Package Procurement (TPP)  
 Created Defense Contract Administration Service and Defense Contract 
Audit Agency to oversee contractors 
 1969: Blue Ribbon Defense Panel  
 Placed greater emphasis on prototype testing to reduce technical risk 
 1969-1972: David Packard Reforms  
 Management through Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council 
(DSARC) - limited oversight at 3 decision milestones, guided by 
Development Concepts Paper (DCP) 
 Empasized improved cost and schedule estimates, better system 
definition, and earlier identification of risk factors 
 
5 NPS – May 13, 2015 
  
1970-80’s Reform 
 1972: Congressional Commission on Government Procurement  
 Main focus: relationship between government and industry, and timely 
payments to contractors 
 Recommended the creation of  the Office of Federal Procurement Policy, 
acquisition of more commerical products, and simplifying acqusition 
processes and regulations 
 1981:Acquisition Improvement Plan: decentralized approach  
 Increased role for the Services in PPBS 
 Promoted multi-year procurement to stabilize programs in the face of budget 
fluctuations and advocated for “more realistic” budgeting 
 1982: Nunn-McCurdy Amendment 
 Congressional notification of 15% unit cost growth and cancellation (unless 
OSD waiver) for 25% unit cost growth 
 1983: Carlucci Initiatives 
 32 initiatives focused on streamlining the acquistion process and achieving 
greater efficiency by removing regulations   
 Streamlined DSARC, only two Milestones: requirements and production 
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Packard Commission and Defense 
Reorganization Act of 1986 
 1986: Packard Commission – many of its recommendations enacted in 
Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (Goldwater-Nichols Act) 
 Created a clear chain of command 
• USD for Acquisition to serve as the Defense Acquisiton Executive 
• Each service/component would have a component acquisition executive (CAE) to 
report to the USD (as well as to the Service Secretary) 
• Within DoD components, Program Managers report to Program Executive 
Officers appointed by the component executive 
 Recommended revamped Joint Resources Management Board for 
requirements generation, co-chaired by USD (A) and a newly-created 
position, vice-chairman of the JCS [implementation dropped the USD(A)] 
 Advocated for commerical purchases, multiyear procurement, competitive 
prototyping, enhanced long-term DoD budgetary planning, and two-year 
appropriations bills from Congress 
 Bill Perry as Secretary of Defense 
• Pushed for Commercial specs and standards 
• Put out a DoD Directive (June 29, 1994) - - known as the “Perry Memo” 
(titled “ A New Way of  Doing Business” 
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1990’s - Faster, Better, Cheaper 
 1993 Section 800 Report 
 Proposed more commercial integration and expanded exemptions for 
the Truth in Negotiations Act 
 Many recommendations were adopted during the 1990’s 
 1993 H.R. 2238 Federal Acquisition Improvement Act 
 Encouraged commercial product acquisition, strengthened the bid 
protest process, and streamlined small purchases 
 1994 S. 1587 Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act 
 Accepted many Section 800 Report recommendations 
 Emphasized commercial acquisition and major system statutes 
 1995 Defense Standards Improvement Council – USD(A) formed 
Tiger Team on Metrics 
 Proposed strategic outcome metrics for measuring the impact of 
acquisition reform (initial metrics covered cost, acquisition 
performance, schedule, and commercial practices)  
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Recent Reforms 
 1995 Clinger-Cohen Act 
 Imposed increased milspec requirements on new contracts (reversed 
Perry Initiative to use commercial specs and standards) 
 Single Process Initiative allowed each facility to shift to one format 
 Created the CIO position, and resulted in ambiguity in IT acquisition 
responsibility 
 Urged use of commercial I.T. 
 1997 Defense Reform Initiative 
 Emphasized adopting modern business practices by streamlining 
organizations, increasing competition, and eliminating waste 
 2002 DoDD and DoDI 5000.02 rewritten 
 Established milestones and requirements decision points in the Defense 
Acquisition System 
 2008 FY07 John Warner National Defense Act 
 Required DoD to update Congress biannually on implementation of 
acquisition reform 
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Recent Reforms (cont.) 
 2009 Joint Capabilities and Integration Development System Introduced 
 Enhanced methodology to identify and describe capabilities gaps 
 Engaged the acquisition community earlier  
 Better defined non-materiel aspects of materiel solutions  
 Helped to prioritize capability gaps and proposals 
 2009 FY08 H.R. 4986 National Defense Authorization Act 
 Established the Defense Acquisition Workforce Development Fund 
 Created the Defense Materiel Readiness Board 
 2009 S. 454 Weapon System Acquisition Reform Act 
 Required periodical assessments and MDAP prototyping 
 Established requirement for Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation 
(CAPE) to provide independent cost analysis to SecDef 
 2010 Better Buying Power 1.0 
 Aimed to deliver warfighting capabilities with a constrained budget 
  2012 Better Buying Power 2.0 
 36 initiatives, revising BBP 1.0, that focus on affordability and cost control, increased 
productivity, effective competition, and professionalism 
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Historical Cost and Schedule Growth Studies 
Source  Sample Findings  
Fox 2012 38 major programs 
in ‘60s 
38 ongoing programs in 1969 had cost estimates 
50% higher than original 
RAND 1979 17 mature 
programs in ‘70s 
Mean cost growth was 34%, dollar weighted mean 
cost growth was 20% 
RAND 2006 46 completed 
programs from 
1968-2003 
Mean total cost growth, adjusted for quantity 
changes, was 46% from Milestone II baseline 
RAND 2008 35 completed 
programs 
Total cost growth was 60%: 12.9% for 
requirements, 21.9% for quantity, 10.1% for cost 
estimate, 8.9% for schedule changes 
2013 
Performance 
of the Defense 





Total median cost growth is 44% for the Army (97 
programs), 30% for the Navy (146), and 31% for 
the Air Force (179) 
2014 
Performance 






Mean cost growth for development: 48-87% Mean 
cost growth for production: 18-30% 
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Cost and Schedule Growth 
 From 2000-2012 median cost and schedule growth for MDAPs was 
29% and 30 months respectively 
 Caused by high risk, low cost and schedule baselines, optimistic 
performance standards, uncertain requirements, and other factors 
(such as changes in budgets, quantities, technologies, etc.) 
 Programs vulnerable when concurrency strategy used 
 GAO found that 80% of surveyed programs conducted at least 30% of 
development testing during production, despite risks 
 Difficult to control cost and schedule as programs become 
increasingly complex 
 Regulations, reporting, and oversight requirements that add no value 
to program performance are also factors 
In spite of all of the reform initiatives, cost and 
schedule growth has seen little improvement.  
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Challenges to Defense Acquisiton System 
I. What is Acquired  
II. How Goods and Services are Acquired  
III. From Whom Goods and Services are Acquired 
IV. Who is Responsible for Acquisition, and who does 
the Acquisition 
V. How systems are supported (Logistics is highest cost 
area, but not “world class”) 
13 
All five areas are critical – and currently have 
problems 
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Summary : To Successfully respond to the 21st Century 
Environment 
 20th Century policies, assumptions, laws, structures, acquisition 
practices, must change! 
 Requires a focus on: 
 Affordability (in “requirements;” equipment and services selection; 
design; force structure, etc.) 
 Changes to resource allocations and structures (dollars; people; 
organizations; industry; globalization; education and training; etc.) 
 Flexibility and responsiveness 
 Staying ahead 
 The importance of the acquisition workforce 
 
“Smart Competition” - - effectively applied - - can provide the required 
higher performance, lower costs, higher quality, flexibility, and 
responsiveness for 21st Century Security needs 
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The Issue 
What specific reforms are needed now, and 
how should they be implemented? 
  Legislative 
  Regulatory 
  Organizational 
  Cultural 
 Other 
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Acquisition Reform Suggestions 
 Stable (e.g. multi-year) and realistic budgeting, and scheduling 
 Realistic and affordable requirements; include cost as a requirement 
 Remove barriers to civil/military industrial integration 
 Use appropriate contract structure to incentivize contractors 
 Streamlining and training on “buying commercial” (goods and services) 
 Move to “Performance Based Logistics” 
 Reduce the regulatory and reporting burden 
 Gain the economic and military benefits of globalization (reduce the barriers) 
 New 5000 series for services and I.T. 
 Leverage the benefits of Public-Private Partnerships 
 Reintroduce Public/Private competitions for non-inherently governmental 
work 
 Reduce focus on compliance and incentivize program performance (shift 
balance of power from contracting to program management) 
 Improve government/industry interchanges (on personnel and policy 
development) 
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Backups 
NPS – May 13, 2015 
  
I. What is Acquired (Planning) 
 Long-term and strategic planning is hindered by changing budget 
priorities 
 DoD shapes its priorities by issuing a Future Years Defense Program 
that analyzes expectations for the next five years 
 However, most DoD spending is discretionary, and Congress debates it 
each year 
 DoD is limited by Congressional appropriations subject to 
fluctuations on a yearly basis 
 Budget Control Act sequester cuts beginning in FY2016 will make long-
term planning even more challenging 
 Different priorities lead to different funding plans 
 Appropriations to DoD can be very different from the initial budget 
request 
 More realistic budgets and stable estimates in the planning stages 
would prevent many future issues 
B-1 
(continued                 )  
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I. What is Acquired (Requirements) 
 A large part of the decision-making process is determing the 
requirements for the development and production of the weapon system 
 Requirements generation and resource allocation are often not 
coordinated 
 Too many programs are started given limited resources -- causes DoD to 
ask for additional funds or cut other programs 
 The Joint Requirements Oversight Council lacks consistent and 
standardized metrics to inform decisions between competing programs 
and capabilities within them 
 OSD, the Services, and the JROC do not have an adequate modeling 
capability to assist in determining program tradeoffs 
 Analysis of Alternatives, Initial Capability Document, and Capability 
Development Document are the major reviews 
 Cost is not considered  a “requirement” (but, it does drive quantity – 
which is a “requirement”) 
B-2 
(continued                 )  
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I. What is Acquired (Technological 
Maturity) 
 There is often little coordination between the military services 
regarding which technology should be the priority in research and 
development 
 The maturity of technology is hard to assess in programs suffering 
‘requirements creep’ 
 Each time a new technology is incorporated, re-baselining of the 
weapon system occurs; which in turn leads to cost and schedule 
growth 
 Technology that is immature, according to the Technology Readiness 
Assessment, can be incorporated past Milestone B 
 Leads to problems later on if the technology is not ready when it needs 
to be 
 Without leveraging private sector innovations and global 
commercial technologies, DoD’s technical lead could diminish 
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II. How Goods and Services are 
Acquired (Contracting Strategies) 
 Appropriate contract type must be used to promote effective 
competition and incentivize high contractor performance 
 Often reforms promote contract types as universal fixes 
 Periodic use of fixed price contracts in development have failed 
• 1960s: TPP resulted in cost overruns for major programs: Lockheed C-5A, 
General Dynamics F-111, and Grumman F-14A  
• 1991: McDonnell-Douglas A-12 Avenger cancelled because of extreme 
costs overruns ~ $2 billion, and 1 year delay for first flight 
 Short-term contracts with frequent competitions for services contracts 
 Lowest Price Technically Acceptable used on non-commodities and 
complex goods or services – often leads to “race to the bottom” 
 Overuse and inappropriate use of ID/IQ contracts 
 Competition often confined to development, with sole source 
production 
 e.g. cancellation of F-35 alternate engine program (in spite of results 
of “great engine war”) 
 
B-4 
(continued                 )  
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II. How Goods and Services are 
Acquired (Program Management) 
 Programs start with unstable requirements or lack sufficient Key 
Perfromance Parameters – difficult to assess performance and leads to 
changes in requirements, causing schedule delays and cost growth 
 Program Managers have limited control over critical aspects of 
programs: funding, requirements, and staff; limiting their ability to 
effectively “lead” or “manage” 
 Best opportunity for risk reduction is Technology Development phase, 
however this is before System Requirements Review 
 Immature technologies are incorporated and it is too early to predict the 
risk of disrupting the program goals 
 The milestone requirements that a weapon system must comply with 
creates a significant burden for both government and contractors 
 Compliance often adds to cost and schedule growth, without having a 
positive effect on performance or development 
 Developing system-of-systems compounds the mangement challenges; 
but makes sense to plan for (vs. sole focus on individual platforms) 
 
B-5 
(continued                 )  
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II. How Goods and Services are Acquired 
(Cost and Schedule Estimates) 
 Misleading and poor estimation of cost and schedule in 
initial planning stages is a major contributor to overruns 
 Perverse incentives exist for industry and military services 
to provide unrealistic cost, schedule, and risk estimates for 
program approval  
 Difficult to provide estimates for: 
 High-risk development programs   
 Programs relying on technologies to mature 
 System-of-systems programs (impact individual weapon 
requirements) 
 Level of funding is hard to predict on year-to-year basis 
 Program managers struggle to achieve planned efficient 
production rates 
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III. From whom Goods and Services are Acquired 
(Defense Industrial Base) 
 Profit margins are lowest in defense, compared to other major sectors 
 Guidelines issued encouraging vertical integration, with less competition 
 Excessive regulations deter entry into the defense marketplace and limit 
competition due to compliance costs 
 Legal and regulatory barriers preclude DoD from gaining the full benefits of 
globalization 
 DoD often unable to access cutting-edge technologies driving commercial 
markets 
 Commercial firms are hurt by regulatory creep 
 Government-unique standards are requested too often  
 Information other than pricing for commercial items is requested (e.g. cost) 
 Cost and pricing requirements for modifications to commerical items must be 
provided 
 Unfavorable intellectual property regulations deter entry by commercial firms  
 Small and midsize businesses are not always appropriately utilized 
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IV. Who is Responsible for Acquisition  
 High turnover in senior level management makes long-term planning 
challenging 
 SecDef has a tenure averaging 30 months while the DepSecDef has an average 
tenure of 23 months 
 Average tenure for other senior DoD officials is 11 – 20 months 
 Size and demographics of the acquisition workforce 
 DoD acquisition workforce is too small, and often with the wrong skill mix – the 
workforce is now half of what it was in the 1990’s (and 55% have less than 5 
years experience) 
 Training, motivating, and maintaining a skilled acquisition workforce is 
incredibly challenging 
 Failure to do this can result in an inefficient process and inadequate weapon 
systems being fielded 
 There are many barriers that prevent these employees from performing their 
job to the best of their abilities – these include: burdensome requirements; 
overwhelming oversight measures; and an acquisition culture that values 




(continued                 )  
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Example of the “Crisis” in the Public Sector Workforce 
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Three Important Considerations (regarding who does the 
work) 
1. The Government is still responsible for the 
overall management, oversight, and source 
selection  
 
2. Higher performance, at lower costs, can be 
achieved if competitive source selection is based 
on “best value”  
 
3. The Government must do the inherently-
governmental work (e.g. war-fighting, budgeting, 
source selection, etc.) 
B-10 
But, for non-inherently-governmental work being done by 
government employees, why not have public/private competitions 
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Results of DoD Public/Private Competitions: 1978 - 1994 
510 $470 27%
733 $560 36%
Marine Corps 39 $23 34%
806 $411 30%












Defense Reform Initiative Report,   
Nov 1997  
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DoD “Competitive Sourcing” (A-76) 






























   28%** 
     38%*** 
Source: Competitive Sourcing: What Happens to Federal Employees? Jacques S. Gansler and William Lucyshyn, October 2004  
* MEO= Most Efficient Organization (as proposed by government workers) 
   
** Even for the competitions won by the contractor, the MEOs proposed                                                    
decreases of 28% in the FTE headcount   
 
***No matter who won, the involuntary terminations of government workers                                      
(RIFs) averaged only 5% 1) 
B-12 
But Congress has 
“outlawed”A-76 
competitions! 
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Results comparisons in Availability and Response 
Time (PBL is “Performance Based Logistics”)* 
F-14 LANTIRN 
Navy Program Pre-PBL Post-PBL* 
H-60 Avionics 
 
F/A-18 Stores  








Material Availability Logistics Response Time 
Pre-PBL Post-PBL* 
56.9 Days 5 Days 
52.7 Days 8 Days 
42.6 Days 2 Days CONUS 
7 Days OCONUS 
28.9 Days 2 Days CONUS 
4 Days OCONUS 
35 Days 6.5 Days 
* PBL  is contractor-based [an AIA study said PBL could save $25-$30 billion per year] 
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Barriers to Comprehensive Reform  
   Congress is an incredibly influential actor 
 The nature of legislation and current trends indicate that major change will take 
time 
 Even with considerations of DoD’s budget given the upcoming sequester cuts 
imposed by the Budget Control Act, there is no consensus on what should be cut 
or preserved 
 Measures to increase flexibility and decrease oversight will be resisted 
 The existing system of regulations is the result of decades of reform 
 Regulations are dense and come from a variety of sources that are not easily 
reconciled – acquisition officer handbook is 960 pp., DFARS is 1,903 pp., and 
FAR is 2,014 pp., Federal regulatory code 180,000 pp. 
 Will be incredibly challenging to overhaul or edit – adding on is easier than 
taking away or completely redoing 
 It is often difficult to identify problem areas in the system and fix them 
 This leads to broad reforms that target the issues of one program, but impede 
progress on all others in the system 
 Strong cultural resistance to change (from Services, Unions, Incumbent 
Firms, etc.) 
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Total Number of Pages in the Code of  
Federal Regulations* 
 
Note 1:  That the sum of corp. tax and individual taxes in 2011 was $1.402 trillion (far less than the estimated 
regulatory compliance costs). 
 
Note 2: The TASC/Coopers and Lybrand study of the 18% “regulatory cost impact on DoD purchases” was 
done in 1994. A 2014 Air Force report said the regulatory cost increase  is now 25%. 
OMB and SBA estimated Regulatory Compliance costs of $1.752 trillion in 2008 
(up from $1.1 trillion in 2005 and $843 billion in 2001)** 
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Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM) Program 
 
  The JDAM System is a tail kit for converting gravity guided 
munitions to GPS or computer-  
guided munitions (i.e. converting 
“dumb” bombs to “smart” bombs) 
 
 A key “pilot program” in DoD’s 
push for using commercial 
acquisition strategies – granted 
expedited waiver status (25 in total) 
 
 Program cost figures: 
 Historical system price 
estimate: $68,000 (i.e. “ICA”) 
 Price requirement: $40,000 
 Realized system price:$18,000 
 
 Strategy  
 Continuous competition 
 Max. commercial 
 Warranties 
 “Best value” selection 
 Experienced PM 
 
 A Success Story 
 Requirements (per CSAF)  
1. “Hit the target” 
2. “Work” 
3. “Cost under $40,000” 
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